Pseudonymisation provides the means to reduce the privacy impact of data collection and processing on individual subjects. Its application on data records, especially in an environment with additional constraints, like re-identification in the course of incident response, implies assumptions and privacy issues, which contradict the achievement of the desirable privacy level. Proceeding from two real-world scenarios, where personal and identifying data needs to be processed, we identify a system model for pseudonymisation and explicitly state the sustained privacy threats. With this system and threat model, we derive privacy protection goals together with possible technical realisations, which are integrated into our event pseudonymisation framework PEEPLL for the context of event processing, like auditing of user activities. Our framework provides privacy-friendly linkability in order to maintain the possibility for automatic event correlation and evaluation, while at the same time reduces the privacy impact on individuals. With this framework, privacy provided by event pseudonymisation can be enhanced by a more rigorous commitment to the concept of personal data minimisation.
INTRODUCTION
Monitoring and auditing of user, process, and network activities plays an important role for observing unusual behaviour and possibly detect or prevent attacks. However, this also has severe privacy implications. Each data record might contain identifying attributes of a person, like names, IP addresses, or user ids alongside other personal data [1, Article 4(1) ]. Such identifying data is called quasi identifiers (QIDs) [2] and comprises directly identifying features as well as features that potentially identify individuals in combination. Analysing such data facilitates the creation of user profiles and social networks as well as tracking of user activities, performance, and preferences. In order to reduce that impact, measures of de-identification 1 can be applied. One possible measure is the application of pseudonymisation [5] , which replaces a QID of a subject with a pseudonym in order to prevent or impede its identification, while maintaining the possibility of re-identification and linkage of individual data records.
However, using pseudonymisation to provide such privacyfriendly linkability of individual data records has its limitations. Recent history has shown, that even properly de-identified data can be re-identified with the right background knowledge [3, 6, 7, 8] . This strongly indicates that it is inherently impossible to achieve an absolute de-identification in general. If, however, privacy is not seen as absolute, but rather in a sense of reduction of exposure, e. g., minimisation of QIDs, as it has been postulated by Sweeney [3] and Ohm [4] already, pseudonymisation remains a valid tool to enhance the privacy of individuals in the context of data processing.
In view of these facts, our main contributions can be summarised as follows: (1) The explicit formulation of a system and threat model of event and data record pseudonymisation and the highlighting of remaining privacy threats, (2) the proposal of privacy protection goals, that increase privacy by minimising personal data, and (3) the design and development of a pseudonymisation framework.
SYSTEM & THREAT MODEL
Consider the following two scenarios, where pseudonymisation of data records is needed:
Scenario 1 An organisation has deployed a distributed security system consisting of several sensors in order to detect anomalous activities. All sensor data is combined at a central unit, which provides abilities to analyse and correlate data. Most importantly, the data of all sensors has to be archived for a certain amount of time to allow a thorough investigation in cases of security breaches. Scenario 2 A consortium of independent medical institutions wants to collect and share medical data on the treatment and outcome of rare diseases to be able to improve the quality of treatments. The collection should be able to incorporate data from patients' follow-up examinations over time. Therefore, the data is only useful for research purposes when it is not completely deidentified. The two scenarios highlight the following privacy requirements:
Personal Data Minimisation In both scenarios, the processing of data records has severe implications for the privacy of users. To mitigate this effect, the principle of personal data minimisation should be applied [9] . Effective mechanisms for data minimisation are Select before you Collect [10] and Pseudonymisation.
Linkability Linkability [5] provides the context to set individual records in relation and is the basis for correlation and interpretation in intrusion or anomaly detection or statistical analysis.
Global Pseudonym Consistency Both scenarios have the requirement, that all data records, which concern the same subject, must be pseudonymised such that linkability is maintained regardless of the data source. Otherwise, results are distorted.
Pseudo-vs. Truly-random Pseudonyms There are two ways to maintain global pseudonym consistency: First, a derivation of pseudonyms solely from data records and in a deterministic manner. However, Marx et al. [11] demonstrated, that preimage attacks via brute force to uncover such pseudonyms can be done with reasonable effort. Not susceptible to brute force attacks are pseudonyms, which are truly randomly chosen. In the latter case, determining whether a random pseudonym has already been chosen for a given QID (to maintain global pseudonym consistency), a global mapping from QIDs to corresponding random pseudonyms has to be consulted.
System Model
The identified requirements result in the following system model for our pseudonymisation framework PEEPLL (see Fig. 1 ): A data source is emitting some representation of an event or some medical record, which for brevity will be called data record and which possibly contains personal data of a subject. A so called Depositor assigned to that data source has the task to replace a QID of a subject, if present, with a pseudonym. For that, it requests a pseudonym for each QID from a so called Pseudonym Vault (PVault) and upon receiving a response from the PVault, replaces the identifier with the pseudonym. The PVault receives a pseudonym request from a Depositor. If there already exists a pseudonym in the pseudonym lookup table it is sent to the Depositor. Otherwise, a new truly-random pseudonym is created and stored together with the corresponding QID. The pseudonymised data record is then sent from the Depositor to the data processing unit.
Remarks: The integrity and confidentiality of all communication is protected. The pseudonymisation process is transparent to the data sources and the processing unit. The PVault is needed in order to provide truly-random pseudonyms while at the same time maintain global pseudonym consistency. Communication for the pseudonymisation process only is needed between the Depositors and the PVault, not between the Depositors themselves.
Threat Model
PEEPLL does not aim at providing provable privacy against strong external or internal attackers. In fact, there are several threats, which directly undermine the privacy protection mechanisms of PEEPLL, mainly because of their fundamental nature. One example is the ability of a malicious Depositor to ignore pseudonym responses from the PVault and use his own pseudonyms. Apart from organisational rules and regulations, there are no protection mechanisms, which could be deployed by PEEPLL in order to prevent these threats.
However, PEEPLL moves away from a binary distinction between full privacy on the one hand and no privacy on the other hand, but rather sees privacy as a non-formalised continuum. With this association of the term privacy, the minimisation of existing identifying and quasi-identifying features in a system exacerbates the privacy threats mentioned above and increases the privacy of individuals. Thus, the main focus of PEEPLL is the strict minimisation of QIDs, including meta data of the pseudonymisation process itself, such as re-usage patterns of pseudonyms. It tries to maintain only the information with is really needed. In particular, PEEPLL facilitates amongst others:
• Preserving confidentiality of QIDs with respect to the PVault,
• minimizing meta information about the usage count of existing pseudonyms, • limiting the linkability of related data records, and • minimizing information about which entry of the pseudonym lookup table matches a queried QID.
PEEPLL
Pseudonymisation alone does not protect against tracking, profiling, and re-identification. We considered the following protection goals for the design and implementation of PEEPLL. Each protection goal aims at reducing the impact on the privacy of individuals. The overall challenge is to preserve the linkability of certain data records to some specifiable extent.
Re-use Indistinguishability
Definition: The information about whether or how often a pseudonym has been used before by any Depositor is only known to the PVault. A Depositor should not be able to distinguish whether a pseudonym has been used before by any other Depositor.
From a technical point of view, in order to protect the Re-use Indistinguishability, the PVault is responding to a pseudonym request of a Depositor in such a way, that both cases, the generation of a new pseudonym and the finding of a matching entry in the pseudonym 
Deposit Confidentiality
Definition: The QID, which is to be replaced with a pseudonym by a Depositor, is only known to this Depositor. Neither the PVault nor any other Depositor learn any information about the underlying QID from a pseudonym request or a deposit, except another Depositor is processing the same QID as well.
PEEPLL utilises HMACs by equipping all Depositors with a shared secret k not known to the PVault. Given k and a QID, a Depositor computes a lookup token T QID = Mac(k, QID) using the HMAC tag-generation function. The PVault contacts the global pseudonym lookup table PM and returns an entry with a matching lookup token or creates a new random pseudonym and stores it together with T QID . The Depositor replaces the QID with the received pseudonym P QID and carries on. Compare Fig. 2 . This approach additionally establishes Global Pseudonym Consistency.
Matching Pseudonym Unobservability
Definition: Which pseudonym from the pseudonym lookup table actually matches a specific data item requested by a Depositor is only known to the Depositor itself. In other words, the PVault does not learn any information about which entry of the pseudonym lookup table matches a queried deposit.
It does not matter if the QIDs, which need to be pseudonymised, can be processed as plaintexts or if they need to be concealed in order to protect the Deposit Confidentiality. Because of this, in the following, they are denoted as data item E. In its most simple form, this protection goal can be achieved by sending the whole pseudonym lookup table to each Depositor who requests a pseudonym, so that the PVault does not learn about the entry of interest. However, besides the need of a great amount of bandwidth, this approach raises two problems:
Privacy Issue All existing data items as well as their corresponding pseudonyms will become known to the requesting Depositor, which contradicts the principle of Data Minimisation and the limitation of the scope of one Depositor. PEEPLL balances this conflict and additionally saves bandwidth by limiting the number of returned pseudonym lookup table entries, while at the same time assures, that this number is truly greater than one. A Depositor creates a mask from the data item, which can be applied to the pseudonym lookup table by the PVault and matches both Depositor PVault
[UpdateMapping] the entry of real interest as well as other irrelevant entries. For this purpose we employ Bloom Filters 2 . Blinding a fixed number of randomly chosen bits of the filter accomplishes a controllable artificial false positive rate, which influences the probability, that more than one entry matches a given lookup token. The PVault applies the lookup token to PM and returns a set of all matching pairs of pseudonyms and the corresponding data items. The Depositor chooses the appropriate pseudonym and replaces the data item E with it. New Data Item Issue The second problem relates to the case of a data item, which does not exist in the pseudonym lookup table yet. In this case, the returned set only contains irrelevant entries, which are sorted out by the Depositor. The Depositor has to request the creation of a new pseudonym from the PVault, thereby thwarting Re-use Indistinguishability and also Matching Pseudonym Unobservability, since the creation request unambiguously references the data item of real interest. This can only partially be fixed by forcing the creation of dummy pseudonyms after each request.
Combined Deposit Confidentiality and Matching Pseudonym Unobservability
We combined the mechanisms explained in Sect. 3.2 and Sect. 3.3 in PEEPLL with certain optimisations, which provide a more tailored solution and which closely relate to the concept of Secure Indexes 3 . Secure Indexes paired with HMACs Given the shared secret k, a Depositor creates a Bloom Filter as lookup token T QID = BF (k, QID) for the data item QID. The Bloom Filter is constructed indeterministically by choosing a random subset of keyed hash functions to mitigate query profiling as discussed by Goh [13] . The lookup token then is sent to the PVault, who owns the pseudonym lookup table PM, which is a set of triples each consisting of a Bloom Filter, an HMAC, and a corresponding pseudonym for already processed QIDs. The PVault returns a set of all pairs of HMACs and pseudonyms whose respective Bloom Filter is a superset of T QID . To recognize the proper pseudonym in the received result set, the Depositor compares a locally computed HMAC to the received HMACs. If no match is found, the Depositor sends a pair consisting of a HMAC and a blinded 4 Bloom Filter (in this case using all keyed hash functions), which correspond to the QID. The PVault updates the pseudonym lookup table PM by storing this pair together with a newly generated random pseudonym, which is finally returned to the Depositor. This interaction is shown in Fig. 3 .
Solving Weak Deposit Confidentiality The presented approach still raises a special challenge. In cases where Depositors get hold of foreign deposits (as it is the case with the false positives in the result set) they can still launch a brute-force attack, since the secret key used to establish Deposit Confidentiality is shared among all Depositors. We refer to this problem as Weak Deposit Confidentiality. To mitigate it, the result set elements have to be processed in a way, that conceals all deposits except the one of real interest for the Depositor, before leaving the PVault. A solution is the application of 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer 5 (OT) with adjustments to overcome its major obstacles for our setting: 1) The first obstacle concerns the missing fixed indices, which are used to pinpoint a specific entry of the pseudonym lookup table on the side of a Depositor as the receiver of the OT protocol. A solution is the utilisation of the HMACs themselves as indices of a hash map storing the corresponding entries of the pseudonym lookup table. To avoid the to-be-prevented vulnerability to brute-force attacks via this indices the HMACs are hashed a second time together with the OT-specific entry key. The Depositor who requests the pseudonym for a specific QID can calculate the OT-key, which is used to decrypt the requested deposit out of the received set of encrypted deposits. 2) The second obstacle concerns the computation and communication overhead introduced by the OT protocol. This obstacle can be mitigated by not using the whole pseudonym lookup table as input for the sender (PVault), but limiting the inputs to the ones requested by the Depositor via the Bloom Filter.
Limited Linkability
Definition: The linkability of data records concerning the same QID should only be maintained for a limited period.
Limiting the linkability constitutes a trade-off between Data Minimisation and Linkability, which is highly application-specific. The following technical mechanisms to achieve Limited Linkability are realised in PEEPLL:
Temporal Limitation by Global Epochs Temporally limiting the linkability of pseudonyms is realised by introducing epochs, at whose beginning all pseudonyms are changed. The PVault is enforcing the limitation by deleting the existing pseudonym lookup table. On the Depositor's side, temporal limitation is achieved by utilising HMACs in the same way as for Deposit Confidentiality but in combination with an epoch specific tag. An advantage of this is that the limitation is enforced if at least one party complies. We refer to this two-sided enforcement as anytrust.
Budget Limitation By limiting the linkability with a budget, it is not possible to re-use a pseudonym after the budget has been exceeded by prior re-uses. Such an approach can be achieved by introducing usage counters for each pseudonym on the PVault. To prevent the revelation of the actually matching pseudonym to the PVault when enforcing Matching Pseudonym Unobservability, the costs for the current request is added to all matches of the lookup, making the budget counter an upper bound of the actual budget.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This paper works out sustained privacy threats to the pseudonymisation of data records, proposes four privacy protection goals, and presents privacy enhancements in form of a framework. Based on practical scenarios, we identified two important requirements for our event pseudonymisation: Global Pseudonym Consistency, and Linkability. We explained operational limits to the achievable level of privacy by event pseudonymisation, which lead to the formulation of the four privacy protection goals Re-use Indistinguishability, Deposit Confidentiality, Matching Pseudonym Unobservability, and Limited Linkability. For each goal, the technical realisation in PEEPLL was explained. The resulting framework provides the following properties:
• Pseudonymisation with Global Pseudonym Consistency,
• Enforcing Limited Linkability (temporal and budget)
• Protection of Deposit Confidentiality,
• Protection of Matching Pseudonym Unobservability • Protection of Re-use Indistinguishability, but only in combination with Deposit Confidentiality, not with Matching Pseudonym Unobservability. Future work will target the integration of a pseudonym re-identification resp. disclosure process and potential side effects on the privacy protection goals. Further aspects comprise the Weak Deposit Confidentiality, the enforcement of anytrust in the context of Budget Limitation, and the simultaneous protection of Re-use Indistinguishability and Matching Pseudonym Unobservability.
